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Abstract 
In an increasingly complex environment, nations favour using mega sporting 
events and the Olympic Games in particular as opportunities to project their 
images to the outside world. The scale of the Olympic Games and its 
popularity has grown over time, and each modern event steps beyond its 
sporting agenda, having a much stronger social impact than ever before. The 
current paper is grounded in a substantial theoretical base around the concept 
of a “nation brand” and the process of nation branding through mega events 
and the Olympics in particular. It is followed by a case study of the Sochi 2014 
Winter Olympics. A two-stage interpretative qualitative study, consisting of 
interviews and a public survey, was employed to reveal that nation branding 
was indeed one of the major aspects of the Sochi 2014 communication 
strategy. However, it is argued further that the event’s long-term impact on 
public perception of the country is not evident, despite the high quality of the 
organisation process and a warm reception of the event itself. It is argued that 
state-influenced nation branding and the damaging impact of politically 
resonant events, which followed the Olympics, on Russia’s reputation are 
among primary causes why success was not sustainable. The research paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for policy makers. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of place branding through sports has become a recent valuable 
addition to broader national and regional branding strategies. In some cases, 
sport even acts as the focal point of a larger set of image-building measures, 
as it brings unquestionable tangible and intangible benefits to the hosting 
community, receives wide media coverage, and encourages identity building 
through common bonding and shared emotions (Rein and Shields, 2006). 
Through its ‘major cultural influence, with an explicitly political dimension’, 
sport became a tool of proclaiming ‘national autonomy on a global stage’, 
especially for small and developing nations (Tomlinson and Young, 2006: 
p.2). Between other sport-related branding initiatives, bidding for and hosting 
mega sport events is argued to be the most credited one (Rein and Shields, 
2006). The Olympic games is a sports spectacle which unquestionably 
belongs to ‘a select number of prestige ‘mega-events’, ‘[d]efined as festivals 
that achieve sufficient size and scope to affect whole economies and receive 
sustained global media attention’ and which ‘have an ambulatory character 
and are normally subject to a bidding process by potential hosts’ (Gold and 
Gold, 2008: p.302). 
Throughout its history, the Olympic movement experienced a drastic 
transformation, and the modern Olympics barely resemble the earlier events 
of the 19th and the 20th centuries, let alone the tournaments from the times of 
ancient Greece, when the Olympic ideas had a more religious rather than 
secular character (Girginov and Parry, 2005). The increasing media and 
public attention given to the Summer and Winter Olympics, and recently, to 
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the new project of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Youth 
Olympic Games (Judge, Petersen and Lydum, 2009), resulted in raising the 
profile of these events so that bidding candidates are willing to sacrifice vast 
amounts of resources in order to gain the status of a host city and benefit from 
branding and transformational opportunities (Berkovitz et al., 2007; Gold and 
Gold, 2008; Müller, 2012; Zhang and Zhao, 2009). Indeed, the impact of the 
Olympics on host regions and the accompanying urban and infrastructural 
development only increased from the rebirth of the Olympic Movement in the 
19th century to the modern era (Table 1). 
Global awareness of the Olympic games often positively influences 
reputations of host cities, providing opportunities for successful competitive 
place branding (Anholt, 2007). Consequently, the Olympics nowadays spread 
their influence far beyond sports, and is argued to stimulate a whole set of 
changes. The Games are seen to have a significant impact on host cities and 
host communities, accompanied by promises of virtually endless benefits for 
everyone affected (Boykoff, 2014a), resulting in what has been labeled as 
‘festivalisation of city politics’ (Häußermann and Siebel, 1993 cited in Preuss, 
2007). 
Summer Olympic Games Winter Olympic Games 
PHASE ONE: 1896-1904 
Small scale, poorly organised and not 
necessarily involving any new 
development. 
PHASE ONE: 1924-1932 
Minimal infrastructural transformation 
apart from sports facilities. 
PHASE TWO: 1908-1932 
Small scale, well organised and 
involving construction of purpose built 
sports facilities. 
PHASE TWO: 1936-1960 
Emerging infrastructural demands, 
especially transportation. 
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PHASE THREE: 1936-1956 
Large scale, well organised and 
involving construction of purpose built 
facilities with some impact on urban 
infrastructure. 
PHASE THREE: 1964-1980 
Tool of regional development, 
especially transportation and 
Olympic Villages. 
PHASE FOUR: 1960-2004 
Large scale, well organised and 
involving construction of purpose built 
facilities with significant impacts on 
urban infrastructure. 
PHASE FOUR: 1984-2006 
Large-scale urban transformations, 
including multiple Olympic Villages. 
Table 1. The changing infrastructural impact of the Summer and Winter 
Games, 1896-2002 (Source: Chalkley and Essex (1999); Essex and Chalkley 
(2004), cited in Essex, S. and Chalkley, B., n.d.) 
Among the primary causes for hosting mega-events, authors focus on such 
notions as economic impact (Crompton, 1995; Gratton, Shibli and Coleman, 
2006; Szymanski, 2002), urban regeneration (Hall, 2006; Gold and Gold, 
2008; Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Davies, 2010; Müller, 2012; Sadd, 2009), 
place branding at a national and international levels (Alekseyeva, 2014; Bodet 
and Lacassagne, 2012; Zhang and Zhao, 2009; Xing and Chalip, 2006; 
Vanolo, 2007), and many others. Recently, a lot of attention is focused around 
sustainable mega-event legacy in an attempt to make the event-related 
changes and achievements last longer than the event itself (Chappelet, 2012; 
Preuss, 2007). Therefore, events in general and mega-events in particular are 
‘regarded as one of the hallmarks of modernity’ (Hall, 2006, p.59) and connect 
to various aspects of social life with an impact on culture, tourism, art and 
many other fields (Bowdin et al., 2011). Even sporting matters in global sport 
events are now more often overtaken by other issues related to social, 
economic, marketing, symbolic, and other objectives of governments and 
organising bodies (Bodet and Lacassagne, 2012). 
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In particular, mega-events are increasingly regarded as a global platform for 
‘reconstruction and repositioning of emerging economies’, where ‘the effects 
of mega-events tend to be even more incisive, as they occasion lavish 
investments and comprehensive building programmes valued in tens of 
billions of dollars’ (Müller and Pickles, 2015: p.122-123). One of the recent 
and most illustrative examples of such events is the Sochi 2014 Olympic and 
Paralympic Winter Games1. The idea that the event was used to project the 
image of the new Russia to the outside world has been extensively discussed 
in the academic literature (e.g., Müller, 2014; Alekseyeva, 2014; Ostapenko, 
2010; Persson and Petersson, 2014; Matthews, 2014). Moreover, one can 
clearly identify the point based on the vision of the Organising Committee, 
promoted by its president Dmitry Chernyshenko: 
Sochi 2014’s efforts are driven by a simple yet very powerful vision: to 
stage the most innovative Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games that 
the world has seen, celebrating the spirit of new modern Russia and 
delivering sustainable positive change that inspires the world (cited in 
Inside the Games, 2010). 
Thus one could argue that “celebrating the spirit of new modern Russia” was 
essentially a nation branding exercise aimed at re-imaging the ex-Soviet 
country in the eyes of an international audience through the Olympics, a 
mega-event with worldwide media coverage and guaranteed attention from a 
global audience.  
                                                        
1 Whenever the Sochi Olympics, the Sochi Games, the Sochi 2014 project or similar are 
mentioned throughout the paper, it implies both the Olympic and Paralympic events (unless 
stated otherwise), as the communication strategy of the project was essentially a single whole for 
its Olympic and Paralympic counterparts. 
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This paper studies the subject of nation branding through mega-events and 
the Olympics in particular, focusing on a case study of the Sochi 2014 
Olympic and Paralympic Games. The research questions that informed this 
study are: 
RQ1. How did the notion of nation branding of Russia through the Sochi 2014 
Olympic and Paralympic games influence the work of the Organising 
committee? 
RQ2. What are the current perceptions of Russia among a foreign audience? 
RQ3. To what extent did the hosting of the Sochi Olympics influence 
perceptions of Russia? 
A two-stage interpretative qualitative study, consisting of interviews and a 
public survey, was employed to address these questions. The paper begins 
with a review of the literature on nation branding, before providing contextual 
background on the Sochi Olympics. The methodology presents the process of 
data collection, before the results and discussion sections analyse the 
findings. The paper then concludes with some implications that arise from the 
research.   
2. Literature review 
2.1. Nation brand: A complex and controversial term 
In order to survive and prosper in a modern competitive and rapidly changing 
global environment, countries need to employ outstanding place brand-
building strategies (Rein and Shields, 2006; Dinnie, 2008) to secure 
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recognition and enhance their reputation for national goods and services. It 
also allows a country to establish an unparalleled national brand personality at 
commercial and political levels (Sun and Paswan, 2011). Some countries 
have gone as far as establishing special government bodies and introducing 
corresponding laws to promote their nation brands (Fetscherin, 2010). 
However, Alekseyeva (2014), for instance, supports Anholt’s argument that 
state-led nation branding is a dangerous exercise, as increasingly open 
access to information can easily reveal incoherence between the promoted 
message and real actions: 
[T]he vast majority of communications-based place “branding” exercises, 
currently carried out by cities, states and regions, are nothing more than 
naked, ineffectual and indefensible exercises of state propaganda, and 
thus are even less likely to modify public opinion than before (Anholt, 
2010 cited in Alekseyeva, 2014). 
Nevertheless, nation branding is a significantly growing trend, whose potential 
and effectiveness draws strong attention from researchers, advisors and 
national governments, striving collaboratively to work out successful image-
improving measures and branding campaigns (Ashworth and Kavaratzis, 
2010). Indeed nation branding is ‘an exciting, complex and controversial 
phenomenon’ (Dinnie, 2008: p.13), thus may be viewed from different 
perspectives. 
Fetscherin (2010) proposes a comprehensive definition considering many 
aspects of a country brand: 
A country brand belongs to the public domain; it is complex and includes 
multiple levels, components and disciplines. It entails the collective 
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involvement of the many stakeholders it must appeal to. It concerns a 
country’s whole image, covering political, economic, social, 
environmental, historical, and cultural aspects. The main objectives of 
country branding are to stimulate exports, attract tourism, investments 
and immigration, and create positive international perceptions and 
attitudes (pp.467-468). 
Anholt (2007, 2010) however argues that the term “nation branding” is only a 
useful but rather arrogant metaphor, a dangerous myth, which misleads policy 
makers and creates assumptions that popular perceptions of a nation can be 
manipulated similarly to corporate brands through advertising and marketing. 
For Anholt, ‘this thing called “branding” is not about communications but about 
policy change’ (Anholt, 2008: p.2). The author therefore suggests the term 
“competitive identity” as ‘a new model for enhanced national competitiveness 
in a global world’ aimed ‘to describe the synthesis of brand management with 
public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism and export promotion’ 
(Anholt, 2007: p.3). Similarly, Kavaratzis (2010) admits that place branding is 
not communicating desirable message to the audience, but taking real actions 
and making the world aware of them. 
Dinnie (2008) sums up: 
When applying the concept of a brand to nations rather than to mere 
products, there is an ethical obligation to do so in an honest, respectful 
manner and to acknowledge the limits of how appropriate it is to treat 
nations as brands. Nations do not belong to brand managers or 
corporations; indeed, if they ‘belong’ to anyone, it is to the nation’s entire 
citizenry (p.15). 
Indeed, nations or places as such cannot be branded in a sense of inventing a  
desired perception of a subject, thus any process of achieving (or earning) a 
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better nation image can only be regarded as adding value to existing 
perceptions (Gudjonsson, 2005; Anholt, 2010). Therefore, the term “nation 
brand” is understood through two dimensions: the message projected by 
decision makers, and the image perceived by the target audience, while it is 
admitted that branding as a process, when related to a country, represents 
adding value rather than constructing it. 
2.2. Place promotion and nation branding through the Olympic Games 
Sports in general and sport events in particular are increasingly used by 
regional and national governments for the purposes of place promotion for 
domestic and international audiences, acting as a side theme or even taking 
centre stage in branding initiatives (Rein and Shields, 2006). Tomlinson and 
Young (2006) define a global sport spectacle as ‘an event that has come to 
involve the majority of the nations of the world, that is transmitted globally, 
that foregrounds the sculptured and commodified body and orchestrates a 
physical display of the body politic, and that attracts large and regular 
followings of on-site spectators for the live contest or event’ (p.3). 
Nevertheless, few host cities or nations would spend vast resources on a 
globally transmitted spectacle and not use it as an opportunity for self-
promotion. Nation brand does change over time even in the absence of mega-
events, but their presence certainly helps to achieve nation-branding 
objectives in the short or long term at a more substantial level (Fetscherin, 
2010). Furthermore, these objectives are usually inseparable from politics, as 
international sport festivals have long been associated with politics and 
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ideology from ancient era to modern times all over the world (Tomlinson and 
Young, 2006). This connection is particularly evident in the case of the 
Olympics. Despite Coubertin’s vision of Olympism standing above politics, 
nowadays few would argue that ‘the Olympic myth is rooted in a very political 
vision of the world’ (Persson and Petersson, 2014: p.197). Therefore, ‘[t]he 
notion that the Olympics can sidestep politics is one of the guiding fictions of 
our times, and one propped up by major players in the Olympic movement’ 
(Boykoff, 2014a). 
Berlin 1936, for instance, was the first ‘iconic and politically resonant’ (Gold 
and Gold, 2008: p.304) mega-event, which is believed to have its main 
objective in showcasing the national image and superior strength of Nazi 
Germany, as well as its athletic superiority, despite doubtful ethics behind it 
(Rein and Shields, 2007, Persson and Petersson, 2014, Yao, 2010; Essex 
and Chalkley, 1998). 
The Olympics in Tokyo in 1964 aimed at improving the nation’s reputation 
after World War II, and securing long-term economic benefits for the country 
by strengthening the quality of ‘made in Japan’ label through the values of 
peace, democracy, and technological achievements (Berkowitz et al., 2007; 
Yao, 2010). 
More recently, Beijing 2008 was used as a way to promote the image of 
friendly and open China, a country with a long-term ‘roller coaster relationship 
with the Western world’ (Sun and Paswan, 2012: p.642). Having successfully 
integrated the bid into the national idea of the Chinese 100-year-old Olympic 
dream (Berkovitz et al., 2007), the organisers with the support of the 
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government aimed ‘to use the Olympics as a window into their progress from 
a third-world country to a powerful free market economy’ (Rein and Shields, 
2007: p.78). Despite the critique for focusing on image promotion to the 
outside world and gentrification rather than considering domestic needs 
(Zhang and Zhao, 2009), the event was a success, and its overall positive 
effect on people’s perception of China’s image in general has been studied 
rather profoundly, employing different methodological approaches (for 
example, Bodet and Lacassagne, 2012; Sun and Paswan, 2012; Yao, 2010). 
However, it is hard to determine whether such effects are deep and long-term, 
and which proportion of this improvement can be attributed to the event 
(Bodet and Lacassagne, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the Beijing Olympics was a success from an international 
perspective, which celebrated the globalisation of the mega-event industry 
and marked a shift from hosting mega events predominantly in Western 
Europe and North America (Müller, 2012; Müller and Pickles, 2015), 
becoming a blueprint for using a mega-event as a medium for transmitting 
national soft power, especially in emerging and newly industrialised countries 
(Rein and Shields, 2007; Alekseyeva, 2014). 
Another country integrating sport in many activities of its nation branding 
strategy is South Korea. The image of an industrialised country was promoted 
with help from the hosting of the Seoul 1988 Olympics and the Korea-Japan 
FIFA World Cup in 2002. It is also expected to build this image further with the 
hosting of the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics that are actively 
supported by the Presidential Council on Nation Branding, established in 2009 
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to deliver government-led branding initiatives in collaboration with other 
institutions (Ferrand, Chappelet and Séguin, 2012). 
Finally, one of the latest and most illustrative examples drawing a lot of 
academic and media attention is the XXII Olympic Winter Games and the XI 
Paralympic Winter Games hosted in 2014 in the Russian city of Sochi. In 
Russia specifically, ‘national political and international geopolitical 
considerations script the comprehensive narratives of modernisation and 
recognition that underpin the hosting of mega-events’ (Müller and Pickles, 
2015). Thus the 2014 Winter Olympics, as the dominant project of the 
Russian mega-event agenda, was aimed at obtaining international recognition 
and projecting the image of the new Russia to the rest of the world (Müller, 
2014), to declare national strength and great power status (Alekseyeva, 
2014), and ultimately, to ‘reshape the “red bear” image’ (Ostapenko, 2010: 
p.60) through what Persson and Petersson (2014) termed as intersections of 
two major paradigms: Olympism and the Russian great power myth. The main 
theme was ‘trumpeted very plainly by the Sochi Games: Russia is back as a 
major global player, and doesn’t care how much it costs to show it’ (Matthews, 
2014: p.13). 
However, during the preparation period, various issues were widely discussed 
by the media and researchers (see Arnold and Foxall (2014) for a substantial 
pre-event overview of potential threats). As Dutch journalists Rob Hornstra 
and Arnold van Bruggen (2013) put it in their extensive investigation of the 
Russian Olympic project, ‘the story of modern, prosperous Russia is set 
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against a backdrop of contrasts: poverty, refugees, violence, and human 
rights violations’ (p.5). 
2.3. The Sochi Olympics: Highlights and context 
The Sochi Olympics ‘was one of the biggest events in 2014, not just for 
Russia but also for the world’ (Müller, 2014, p.628). Considering the number 
of Olympic events and the number of participating athletes, it also became the 
largest event in the history of the Olympic Winter Games (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Numbers of participating athletes and sport events in Olympic 
Winter Games, 1924-2014 (Source: compiled from IOC, 2014). 
Shortlisted from the initial set of seven applicant cities2, Sochi received the 
status of a Candidate City along with Salzburg (Austria) and PyeongChang 
(Republic of Korea) in 2006, and was subsequently elected as the Host City in 
the second round of voting (Table 2) during the 119th session of the IOC in 
Guatemala on 04 July 2007 (IOC, n.d.). 
                                                        
2 Notably, the Sochi 2014 project was the third attempt of the Russian resort city to host the 
Olympic Winter Games after two failed bids for 1998 and 2002 Olympics (Arnold and Foxall, 
2014). 
 13 
Round 1 2 
Sochi 34 51 
PyeongChang 36 47 
Salzburg 25  
Table 2. Distribution of votes of the IOC members at the election of the Host 
City for the 2014 Winter Olympics (Source: IOC, n.d.). 
The decision to award the event to Sochi has been labeled as controversial 
(Persson and Petersson, 2014). First of all, intensified by the dispute around 
attending the IOC election sessions by heads of bidding states (Grohmann, 
2009), the idea that Putin’s convincing speech in Guatemala influenced the 
IOC’s decision is not groundless, and alleged lobbying could have taken place 
(Shaw, 2008). As the project evolved over time, it became clear that it is ‘so 
tightly linked to Putin personally that the unity behind Sochi-2014 is hard to 
separate from the unity behind the president’ (Persson and Petersson, 2014: 
p.199). To support his “pet project”, the president spent most of his holidays 
skiing in a nearby resort in Krasnaya Polyana (which later became the 
Olympic Mountain Cluster) and started holding state receptions in his Sochi 
residence (Arnold and Foxall, 2014). Another crucial factor to stimulate the 
debate on the election results was the unplanned appearance of Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, a former IOC President (1980-2001) and Spanish ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, whose first-round win at the IOC presidency election was 
partially indebted to the Soviet bloc at that time (Pound, 2006), and whose 
influence in the Olympic world was still strong in 2007. Thus it could be 
argued that his presence could potentially influence the election results and 
secure the slight majority of votes for Sochi after Salzburg’s elimination 
(Miller, 2012). 
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However the controversy around the bid was only the first challenge to the 
project’s image. To begin with, 2014 marked the 150th anniversary of the 
officially unrecognised genocide of 300,0003  Circassians (an ethnic group 
originally from the Northwestern Caucasus) by the Russian Empire in the 
Sochi region, which entailed a strong opposition campaign “No Sochi 2014” 
by the Circassian diaspora based in New Jersey. They stated that staging the 
Olympics in Sochi, which they consider their historic homeland, was a 
continuation of Russia’s repression of their people (Morris, 2011; Alekseyeva, 
2014; Arnold and Foxall, 2014; Boykoff, 2014a; Persson and Petersson, 
2014). 
Furthermore, the location of Sochi in close proximity to the separatist republic 
of Abkhazia resulted in Georgia’s numerous appeals for relocation of the 
event and further protests against Russia’s support of the breakaway republic 
(Morris, 2011). The country declared a boycott of the Games in 2011, which, 
however, was called back a year later, when a pro-Russian prime minister 
came to power (Arnold and Foxall, 2014). 
Also, Sochi is virtually surrounded by Russia’s most unstable regions in the 
North Caucasus. The most serious threat came from the so-called Caucasus 
Emirate, a radical organisation originating from the times of Chechen Wars in 
1996 and 1999, expressing direct intentions that the Olympics would never 
happen (Arnold and Foxall, 2014). Generally, very serious concerns were 
raised regarding security during the Olympics long before the event started, 
and the question eventually ‘took precedence over economic issues and 
                                                        
3 Some sources estimate the number at 625,000. 
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became central to ensuring that the safe conduct of the Games would 
promote a positive image of Russia and its leaders at home and abroad’ 
(Zhemukhov and Orttung, 2014: p.26). All in all, while all the Olympics in 
general ‘are subject to security threats, those in Sochi in 2014 are without 
parallel in terms of the magnitude of those threats’ (Arnold and Foxall, 2014: 
p.8). 
A further concern was that the local community as a major stakeholder also 
struggled to find substantial individual benefits, thus people were more 
concerned about potential negative impacts (Müller, 2012). Those unfortunate 
ones, who lived on the way of the Olympic construction, had to be resettled 
with compensations reportedly below market prices (Alekseyeva, 2014), 
which also drew a lot of attention in terms of violation of human rights (HRW, 
2013), though ‘early dramatic stories regarding the resettlements proved to be 
exaggerated’ (Wurster, 2013: p.8). 
Another reputation-related issue is Russia’s long-term policy regarding the 
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) community, leading to a refusal to 
register their Sochi branch (Alekseyeva, 2014). Notably, one of the 
explanations why the infamous federal law against “propaganda of 
nontraditional sexual relations” was introduced regardless of the international 
resonance it caused is that it was aimed to unite conservative anti-Western 
movements inside the country to support Putin’s regime after protests in 2011 
(Arnold and Foxall, 2014). Matthews (2014) further argues that it is an integral 
part of a broader strategy to unite ‘large, silent majorities’ of conservatives 
around the world under the Kremlin command (p.12). 
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Other matters in question included (but were not limited by) Russia’s top-
down approach to administration of the Games, alleged corruption, exploited 
labour of migrant workers, and severe pollution (Arnold and Foxall, 2014; 
Alekseyeva, 2014; HRW, 2013). 
Finally, the event was overwhelmingly expensive, which led to an extensive 
discussion in the media, aimed to understand whether such expenditures 
could ever be justified. The ‘federally guaranteed US$12 billion infrastructure 
improvement programme’ was presented in the Sochi 2014 bidding book 
(Sochi-2014 Bidding Committee, 2006). As the event approached, it became 
clear that budget overruns are unavoidable. The independent Russian Anti-
Corruption Foundation estimates the total cost at US$45.8 billion, based on 
open-source information (The Anti-Corruption Foundation, n.d.). Müller (2014) 
mentions the most frequently reported figure of US$51 billion, however, 
estimates the total sum of operational costs, sports-related capital costs and 
non-sports-related capital costs even higher, at just under US$55 billion, with 
96.5 percent of funding being public money. As Yaffa (2014) critically puts it, 
‘[h]ow the Sochi Games grew so expensive is a tale of Putin-era Russia in 
microcosm: a story of ambition, hubris, and greed leading to fabulous 
extravagance on the shores of the Black Sea’. To summarise, the connection 
between the event’s strategic mission with projecting the national brand of 
Russia is not unfounded, but at the same time, various issues outlined above 
could not go unnoticed and inevitably left their imprint on the project’s 
reputation.  
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3. Methodology 
The study will aim to answer the following research questions, influenced by 
the literature review with a consideration of information and resources, 
available for the researcher: 
RQ1. How did the notion of nation branding of Russia through the Sochi 2014 
Olympic and Paralympic games influence the work of the Organising 
committee? 
RQ2. What are the current perceptions of Russia among a foreign audience? 
RQ3. To what extent did the hosting of the Sochi Olympics influence 
perceptions of Russia? 
3.1. Exploring nation brand 
As derived from the literature review, nation or country brand is a complex 
and highly intangible phenomenon which can be viewed from different angles 
and consequently, rather hard to define and measure. 
Nowadays the two most cited nation brand evaluation techniques are Anholt’s 
Nation Brand Index and Futurebrand Country Brand Index, each of which has 
its advantages and followers, though there is no evidence on the superiority of 
any of them. 
The online survey-based Nation Brands Index (NBI) is the outcome of an 
international poll representing ‘the sum of people’s perceptions of a country 
across six areas of national competence’, which ‘measures the power and 
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appeal of a nation’s brand image, and tells us how consumers around the 
world see the character and personality of the brand’ (Anholt, 2005). 
The second global study of nation brands is Country Brand Index by 
FutureBrand. The agency conducts quantitative research collecting data from 
international opinion-makers and business travellers, and combines it with 
qualitative data derived from the interviews with experts in global policy and 
governance (Futurebrand, 2013). The two methods, both primarily based on 
subjective perceptions of nation brands, are used in many research projects 
(Fetscherin, 2010). However, their commercial and proprietary nature results 
in the lack of methodological transparency (Fetscherin, 2010; Sevin, 2014). 
From a broader perspective, Zenker, Knubben and Beckmann (2010) 
distinguish between three approaches to exploring a place brand: qualitative 
analysis based on free brand associations, quantitative measures based on 
questionnaires on different attributes of a given brand, and a group of various 
mixed methods. Either adapting and tuning methods from other disciplines or 
developing new techniques specifically for place brands, researchers 
generally ‘use data gathering and analysis methods available in virtually all 
social science disciplines’ (Sevin, 2014: p.48). 
3.2. A qualitative approach 
The present study will employ a predominantly qualitative approach to 
studying nation branding of Russia through the Sochi Olympics for two major 
reasons. First of all, a comprehensive quantitative research method would 
require pre- and post-event data collection, which was not possible 
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considering the timeframe of the given project. Taking into account the 
research questions, the second reason for choosing qualitative analysis lies in 
the core purpose of the current study, also underpinned by the chosen 
constructivist epistemology and interpretivist perspective on theory. The aim is 
not to find the objective truth or unambiguously prove any assumptions, but to 
get a deeper insight of the subject within its context, considering people’s 
subjective opinions and the researcher’s own reflections (De Vaus, 2001; 
Gray, 2014). Gray (2014) also notes that generally qualitative research is not 
unified and ‘can adopt various theoretical stances and methods, the latter 
including the use of observations, interviews, questionnaires and document 
analysis’ (p.161). 
3.3. Research strategy and data collection 
The active part of the research will consist of two major stages. The first stage 
aims to get comments and insight from the experts in the field, who were 
directly involved in the Sochi 2014 games organisation process. Purposive 
sampling (Gray, 2014) was employed to contact higher-level managers from 
the corresponding functional areas of the Organising committee and its 
contractors, whose work included, above all, picturing the brand of the Sochi 
2014 Olympics (and Russia as its host country) in the eyes of a domestic and 
international audience. Five people expressed their interest to take part in 
anonymous semi-structured interviews (Table 3). 
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No. Organisation Functional Area Type of the 
interview 
Duration Date of the 
interview 
1 Organising 
committee 
Communications Face-to-face 
interview 
19 min 11 August 
2015 
2 Contractor PR Face-to-face 
interview 
42 min 12 August 
2015 
3 Organising 
committee 
Look of the 
Games 
Face-to-face 
interview 
19 min 12 August 
2015 
4 Organising 
committee 
Brand 
Management 
Face-to-face 
interview 
20 min 14 August 
2015 
5 Organising 
committee 
Communications Written 
response 
- Received on 
21 August 
2015 
Table 3. Details of the interviews. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen aiming to fully ‘explore subjective 
meanings that respondents ascribe to concepts or events’ (Gray, 2014: 
p.386). The researcher ensured that leading questions were avoided to retain 
validity, and that particular questions were based on the literature review 
rather than on personal views. All the respondents received the information 
sheets with the research summary and the interview questions in advance, 
and signed individual consent forms before each interview. 
The aim of each interview was to discuss the communication strategy of the 
Sochi 2014 project, the notion of presenting the new image of Russia to the 
rest of the world through the high-profile mega-event, and the influence of this 
notion on the work of the Organising committee, in an ultimate attempt to 
answer the first research question. 
The second part of the research is a public survey. Non-Russian respondents 
were invited to take part in an online questionnaire containing two free word-
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association tasks and additional questions to understand the sample’s 
demographics. The online survey was created and administered using 
Qualtrics software. Non-probability convenience sampling (Gray, 2014) was 
employed, using various social networks and online communities to reach a 
desired amount of respondents, initially set at 100 people at least. 
The survey was inspired to a great extent by the work of Bodet and 
Lacassagne (2012) on international place branding through sporting events 
(particularly, a perspective of British citizens on the Beijing 2008 Olympics), 
underpinned by the theory of image transfer and the co-branding process4.As 
a co-branding process, the strategy of place branding through major sporting 
events ‘is closely related to the appreciation of its impact on people’s 
knowledge, perceptions, opinions and prejudices’, therefore the social 
representation theory is commonly employed as one of the efficient ways ‘to 
assess people’s thoughts, perceptions and opinions of a specific object’ 
(Bodet and Lacassagne, 2012: p.363). The organisation of a social 
representation, in turn, is based on free word-associations, which is qualitative 
in nature and reflects real-life experience and vision of the audience (ibid.) 
Therefore, the current research is based to the highest available degree on 
the study of Bodet and Lacassagne (2012), but tuned to study the co-branding 
process between Russia and Winter Olympic games particularly, at the time 
when the Sochi games is still the latest major Olympic event. 
                                                        
4 Co-branding is defined as ‘a brand alliance that involves either short-term or long-term 
association or a combination of two or more individual brands, products, and/or other 
distinctive proprietary assets’ (Rao and Ruekert, 1994 cited in Xing and Chalip, 2006). Xing and 
Chalip (2006) study this two-way image transfer between event image and destination image, 
while Bodet and Lacassagne (2012) argue that the theory ‘remains theoretically relevant’ in the 
case of the Olympic games in particular, given the strength of the Olympic brand and the nature 
of the organisational process and its stakeholders (p.362). 
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4. Results 
4.1. Stage 1: The interviews 
The interviewees undoubtedly expressed their deep personal and 
professional involvement in the project. Complex tasks set in very difficult 
environment, accompanied by a strong sense of responsibility – these are the 
common characteristics of the Sochi Games given by the respondents. At a 
personal level, they all agreed that the Olympics was an unforgettable 
experience, a powerful historic moment to be cherished, as it will probably 
never happen again. 
4.1.1. The vision 
The grounding statement which set the tone of all the interviews was the 
strategic vision of the Organising committee, declared by its president Dmitry 
Chernyshenko: ‘to stage the most innovative Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games that the world has seen, celebrating the spirit of new modern Russia 
and delivering sustainable positive change that inspires the world’ (Inside the 
Games, 2010). All the respondents unambiguously confirmed that the vision 
indeed strategically defined the major approach to the mission of the 
Organising committee, and all the projects and activities within its different 
departments complied with the vision declared long before the event started. 
Below the vision is split into three parts representing these objectives with 
supporting arguments derived from the interviews. 
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1) “To stage the most innovative Olympic and Paralympic games that the 
world has seen…”  
The preparation process and the event itself employed a variety of innovative 
techniques, applied first of all to the management process: 
‘I am absolutely sure that the most innovative achievements were used in 
the work of all the functional departments <…> We developed some of 
them from the scratch, making the preparation process fundamentally 
different from what was happening in the rest of the country’ (Interviewee 
3, 12 August 2015). 
Apparently, a fundamentally new approach to project management in Russia 
in the case of the Sochi 2014 project was primarily defined by the scale and 
complexity of the task, as well as the fact of staging Winter Olympics for the 
first time in the national history: 
‘Analysing the cases of the past, <…> I have come to a conclusion that 
Sochi 2014 was the first Winter Olympic games, which was staged based 
on the standards for Summer Olympics. <…> From the very beginning 
we have been presented with a task of staging Big Games. We were 
making a huge celebration’ (Interviewee 2, 12 August 2015). 
2) “…celebrating the spirit of new modern Russia…” 
This part of the vision is one of the core determinants of the current research, 
as it represents one of the very few links of academic literature, studying 
Russian national branding through the event, with the official event agenda. 
Notably, Interviewee 1 repeatedly pointed out that the task of the event 
organisers is to stage the Games, but not to project the image of a country or 
touch upon any other political objectives. Therefore, staff members of the 
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Organising committee are probably not the right people to ask about such 
impact of the event. This is a good point to express certain limitations of the 
chosen panel of interviewees. However, inferring from the same interview, the 
Organising committee could not operate in vacuum and was responsible for 
redirecting information flows between various stakeholders, which means that 
they were very familiar with the operating environment and broader objectives 
of the Sochi Olympics. Indeed, all the other informants agreed that presenting 
Russia to an international audience was a substantial part of the event 
mission. Sochi 2014 definitely had much broader objectives than many 
previous Winter Olympics, stretching beyond merely sporting agenda, taking 
into account many circumstances not familiar to other organising committees 
of any previous Games. It is not crystal-clear whether these objectives directly 
underpinned or significantly influenced day-to-day operations of the staff, but 
their overall importance is hardly questioned: 
‘[T]he project as a whole indeed was aimed at presenting new innovative 
Russia, a young country, and strived for breaking existing stereotypes’ 
(Interviewee 4, 14 August 2015). 
‘[T]he general principle, that this is our platform we could use to say 
whatever we want to say, remained unchanged all the time’ (Interviewee 
2, 12 August 2015). 
This aspect was part of the vision, therefore it determined the messages 
that we delivered throughout the Games and during the preparations’ 
(Interviewee 5, received on 21 August 2015). 
However, the aforementioned notion became a double-edged sword: from 
one side, it actually secured a desired degree of synergy, accumulating 
resources and best practices from all over the country. From the other side, it 
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admittedly added some nervousness, as the actual level of responsibility was 
very high. 
3) “…and delivering sustainable positive change that inspires the world.” 
Back in 2007, the Evaluation Commission had very few doubts about the 
Sochi 2014 Environmental and Sustainability programme (IOC, 2007). 
However, a lot of concerns about the event’s environmental impact appeared 
as the Olympics approached, intensified by the lack of transparency of related 
policies for the public (Arnold and Foxall, 2014). Nevertheless, the interviews 
identified certain solid positive outcomes of Sochi 2014: 
‘[T]he Games became the most innovative event, <…>  because we 
actually used effective tools not only in my functional area, but also in all 
the others <…> for the first time in the country and remained as the event 
legacy not only for the sports industry, but also for the whole nation’ 
(Interviewee 3, 12 August 2015). 
According to statistics provided by Interviewee 5, the number of Russian 
people engaged in sports increased from 14.2m in 2007 to 16.7m in 2014; the 
first national standard for “Green construction” and considerations for 
accessibility have been introduced; state-of-the-art sport and supporting 
infrastructure has been created in Sochi, turning the city into a year-round 
resort; a volunteering culture is now being further developed in Russia; and so 
on. 
Overall, this is a valuable addition to very few post-event academic papers, 
which yet again tend to be as skeptical as the majority of previous research. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty here is to define what is a sustainable change 
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inspiring the world, and how to unambiguously prove that a certain change 
has been caused precisely by a given event. Undoubtedly, the event brought 
definite positive changes in many fields at least at a national level, but the 
degree of inspiring the world is quite hard to estimate, especially considering 
its extremely global reach, both planned and achieved. 
4.1.2. A predetermined perception 
The Sochi Olympics and Russia as its host country were under strong media 
pressure, raising worldwide attention to the preparation process and the event 
itself to a very high level. According to Interviewee 2, the Sochi 2014 
communication strategy at an early stage resembled an active defense from 
bullying. Similarly, Interviewee 1 defined the main task of communication-
related functional departments of the Organising committee as a redirection of 
communication flows ensuring the synergy of all the processes within a given 
context. 
In addition, the whole process was complicated by predetermined 
perceptions. Some respondents highlighted that the overall attitude at the 
beginning of the event was initially quite skeptical. It is one of the reasons why 
the overall number of international visitors and sport fans in Sochi was quite 
low. In some cases, journalists deliberately wrote negative articles, sometimes 
even directly dictated by editorial tasks. Nevertheless, the IOC as the main 
governing body have always been very satisfied with the preparation process 
and in the end, highly rated the event itself. This suggests that despite 
negative coverage of the project in mass media, the organisers met all the 
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official requirements of the IOC, International sport federations and other 
supervising bodies. But the overall public perception of the Sochi 2014 project 
was still at a rather low level, partially formed by media influencers. 
Consequently, all negative assumptions could only be dispelled by the event 
itself, for which the Organising committee were well prepared: 
‘We’ve adapted the structure of Communications from London 2012. I[t] 
proved to be effective. <…> The core of the structure was the Committee 
itself <…> which enabled us to coordinate our efforts and to stay in sync 
with our messages’ (Interviewee 5, received on 21 August 2015). 
This was also the right time to step away from the strategy of defense against 
bullying and start communication activities based on the principles of mutual 
respect. Arguably, the turning point was the infamous malfunctioning ring at 
the Opening ceremony, which created a lot of media buzz, but also 
unexpectedly marked the time when everyone directed their attention to 
sports, as it finally became the focal point of the whole project. 
‘I mean, it is generally such a huge complex mechanism, that you cannot 
avoid the times when “a ring would not open”. But luckily, this unopened 
ring was the only one. <…> Everyone was responsible for a particular 
part, but when the parts were combined together, the whole thing worked 
<…> till the end of the Paralympics. <…> {B]y the third day the level of 
negative attitude declined, and then almost disappeared by the fifth day’ 
(Interviewee 2, 12 August 2015). 
Hence the event itself had a huge impact on even the worst skeptics. This 
idea, among other discussed topics, received the strongest unanimous 
agreement of all the interviewees.  
 28 
The event was staged at a deserving level. All the international feedback 
on the Games, including the feedback from the press, pointed out the 
highest level of the Games organisation, presumably, the best of its time. 
The bar was lifted very high, and Russia has delivered what it had 
promised (Interviewee 1, 11 August 2015). 
Moreover, respondents not only expressed their personal experience-based 
views, but also referred to other sources, such as the survey by Nielsen, 
discovering very high approval ratings of the Sochi Olympics among Russian 
citizens (Vedomosti, 2014), or a compilation of short video interviews with 
regular visitors from all over the world unmistakably recalling the Olympic 
slogan “Hot. Cool. Yours.”, and sharing their positive spectator experience 
(Sochi2014, 2014). 
4.1.3. Impact on the nation brand 
The Sochi Winter Olympics was the most televised event of its kind, thus it 
had a certain image-related impact beyond its sports agenda. 
As noted earlier, the Sochi 2014 project exceeded expectations of many. The 
fact that the Organising committee met all its commitments was not 
questioned by any of the interviewees. Therefore, considering its initial 
objectives, scale and global media coverage, one could extrapolate the 
event’s influence to a perception of the whole country. As some respondents 
put it, the Olympics indeed made the wall between Russia and rest of the 
world thinner, and many stereotypes about the country were broken, as 
Russia defended its deserved status of the Olympic host country. On the 
contrary, Müller (2014), for instance, does not find any evidence of improving 
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the national image of Russia, pointing out that negative attitudes to the 
country only increased virtually everywhere except China, not just after the 
event, but also during the preparation process. But what is more noteworthy, 
‘[f]or most other countries, however, whatever gains in global approval and 
recognition the Sochi Olympics may have secured for Russia were eventually 
wiped out by its role as an aggressor vis-à-vis Ukraine’ (Müller, 2014: p.648). 
The current paper does not aim to touch upon any political issues, but this 
rather sensitive but important statement was still presented to the 
respondents for discussion, as little literature is currently available on the 
subject. Some of the respondents shared their thoughts: 
‘I think the potential of this event was unbelievable but <…> has not been 
used at all. I am sincerely sorry for what is happening right now, and 
unfortunately, today no one remembers Sochi and the Games. All the 
bad things <…>  overshadowed Sochi so much that today some people 
deliberately do not see what had happened there’ (Interviewee 2, 12 
August 2015). 
‘I will express my own opinion. When the situation with Ukraine evolved, 
you just realise at some point that eight years of your life are down the 
drain’ (Interviewee 3, 13 August 2015). 
‘I can give you my personal opinion. I think it is actually true. <…> [W]e 
fairly see that the political and economical environment diminished the 
efforts to show our innovativeness and readiness to host modern 
international events and to project our new image effectively’ 
(Interviewee 4, 14 August 2015). 
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4.2. Stage 2: The survey 
As derived from the interviews, there was no specific segmentation of the 
Sochi 2014 foreign audience, therefore, the population for the survey was 
defined as any non-Russian residents including or older than 18 years of age. 
The sample size was 104 respondents. Considering the population size, it is 
very limited and does not allow any generalisation of findings (which is a 
limitation of the study), however, Bodet and Lacassagne (2012) note that such 
sample sizes (the authors themselves surveyed 129 individuals) are rather 
common for similar studies, as ‘above a certain threshold, new and additional 
information gains become marginal’, which is ‘especially the case with objects 
which are strongly socially anchored such as the Olympic Games’ (p.364). 
Moreover, the study is qualitative and interpretative in nature, thus it aims to 
explain the meaning of findings rather than to generalise them. 
Demographic and other characteristics of the sample are presented further. 
 
Figure 2. Age and gender distribution of the surveyed sample. 
The surveyed sample represents a holistic mixture of demographic 
characteristics, however, with notable skewness towards younger age (79.8% 
of the respondents are between 18 and 34 years old), with a majority of 
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female respondents (61.5%), and living in Europe (73.1%). On a scale from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (extensively), the average rate to which the respondents 
followed the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics is 2.31 (SD=1.38). 
 
Figure 3. Geographical distribution and Sochi 2014 following rate. 
Due to the number of participants and the nature of a free word-association 
task presented to them, the survey retrieved a large amount of associations 
for both terms (i.e., 395 unique items for “Winter Olympic Games” and 414 
ones for “Russia”). Following the logic of the model research, the items were 
grouped according to their semantic similarity, ‘as social representations rely 
on main concepts rather than very detailed and specific idiomatic terms’ 
(Bodet and Lacassagne, 2012: p.366). 
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Snow 53.85% Cold Weather 49.04% 
Skiing 50.96% Putin 49.04% 
Cold 39.42% Vodka 39.42% 
Sports 28.85% Moscow 32.69% 
Medals 25.96% Large Territory 28.85% 
Ice-Skating 25.00% 
Russian 
Culture 
25.96% 
International 22.12% Communism 18.27% 
Competition 21.15% Danger 16.35% 
Winning 19.23% Snow 16.35% 
Snowboarding 19.23%   
Russia 19.23%   
Celebration 16.35%   
Sochi 15.38%   
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Bobsleigh 14.42% Power 14.42% 
Athletes 14.42% 
Russian 
Women 
14.42% 
Ice 13.46% Soviet Union 12.50% 
  St. Petersburg 12.50% 
  Corruption 11.54% 
  Siberia 11.54% 
  Cold War 10.58% 
  
Russian 
Language 
10.58% 
  Ukraine 10.58% 
Table 4. Word-associations mentioning rates. 
 
Further following the logic of Bodet and Lacassagne (2012), a 15% cut-off 
threshold was applied, which means that only the words mentioned by more 
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than 15% of the respondents were kept for further analysis, leaving 13 words 
for “Winter Olympic Games” and 9 for “Russia” (Table 4). 
Based on the words ranking, two dendrograms were constructed using SPSS 
22 software, employing Ward’s method and Euclidian distance as statistical 
tools for hierarchical cluster analysis, which is a further replication of the 
model study by Bodet and Lacassagne (2012). The dendrograms indicate ‘the 
links of proximity and then connections between the words composing the 
social representations. The shorter the distance on the graph is and the more 
connected the words are in respondents’ minds’ (ibid.: p.367).  
As shown in Figure 4, social representation of Winter Olympic games is 
visualised by a rather complex structure of connections. ‘[T]he closest link, 
which characterises the closest psychological distance’ (Bodet and 
Lacassagne, 2012: p.367) is observed between two pairs of words: 
“Celebration” and “International”, and “Medals” and “Winning”, which, further 
joined by “Competition” and “Sports”, form the first sub-block. In its turn, it is 
joined by another sub-block made of two other very closely related pairs: “Ice-
Skating” and “Snowboarding”, and “Russia” and “Sochi”, in the end forming 
the first major block, also including a rather distant single term “Cold”. This 
block is then associated to another one formed of “Skiing” and “Snow”.  
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Figure 4. Dendrogram for the Winter Olympic Games’ social representation. 
Figure 5 shows the structure of Russia’s social representation, where two 
pairs are strongly related: “Russian Culture” and “Snow”, and “Communism” 
and “Danger”. Further joined by “Moscow” and “Large Territory”, they form the 
first sub-block. “Cold Weather” and “Vodka” are two other related 
associations, which together with all previously mentioned items form the first 
major block. The second block consists of only one word “Putin”. 
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Figure 5. Dendrogram for Russia's social representation. 
 
  
 36 
5. Discussion 
Overall, the first stage of the research confirmed that hosting the Sochi 2014 
Winter Olympics in Russia was indeed a partial attempt at nation branding. 
The Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics was staged not only to showcase athletic 
achievements, but also was used as a platform to project the image of a 
modern country, open to the rest of the world and capable of staging high-
class worldwide events. However, one of the distinctive qualities of the 
Russian nation branding exercise is that it was performed against a whole set 
of controversies, outlined in the literature review. Answering the first research 
question, the study results ultimately suggest that presenting the image of 
Russia was actually a vital part of the Sochi 2014 international communication 
message, which if not defined all the daily operations of the corresponding 
departments and contractors, still influenced significantly the overall strategy 
and added a certain degree of responsibility and nervousness to the work of 
many. Arising debates on certain controversies, in turn, were either dealt with 
by the communication team of the Organising committee, if they were related 
directly to any of the event aspects, or redirected to the corresponding 
government structures, if they were beyond the committee’s working 
framework. 
However, it is important to note that we cannot speak of nation branding as 
the only (neither the main) purpose of staging the Games. The high quality of 
the event itself was the primary aim for its organisers. After all, even if 
considering the event as a communication platform, no messages can be 
securely delivered if the channel is not credible enough. Therefore, the event 
 37 
organisers, backed by the government’s support, exerted every effort to 
deliver a dazzling sport festival, aiming to exploit the once-in-a-lifetime 
communication opportunity to its fullest, despite the negative public perception 
formed by mass media. As a result, the event itself was a true success in the 
eyes of participants, officials, regular visitors and the press. What is more 
important, the results of the interviews suggest that the Sochi Games 
changed predetermined negative perceptions of many visitors and dispelled 
popular assumptions about possible boycotts and protests. 
Notably, the social representation of Winter Olympic games (Figure 4) does 
not contain any negative associations, neither are they present among the 
words in a 10% - 15% retention range (Table 4). A good example to stress 
this point is the first sub-block (which can be called an international sports 
competition) made up of six strongly related positive words. At the same time, 
however, similarly to the Olympic Games’ social representation by Bodet and 
Lacassagne (2012, p.368-369), no words constituting the main Olympic 
values are present in the structure (i.e., culture, education, solidarity, human 
dignity). 
Another important fact is that two words “Sochi” and “Russia” are among the 
strongest pairs of associations in Winter Olympic Games’ social 
representation, which suggests certain relation of both words to the public 
perception of the term in its current state. Therefore, considering the co-
branding theory, we may suggest that there is at least a one-way influence of 
the Sochi Olympics (particularly, its host city and host country) on the social 
representation of a broader term “Winter Olympic Games”. From a different 
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perspective, it is difficult to unambiguously conclude whether these two words 
were retained because of positive memories associated with this particular 
event or simply because the Sochi Games was the latest occurrence of 
Winter Olympics and recently was a hot topic in the media (especially, taking 
into account that more than 40% of the respondents did not follow the Sochi 
Olympics at all). Moreover, considering recent studies of the event’s impact 
(see, for example, Müller, 2014), we cannot say either whether this influence 
is positive at all. Consider, for example, the cost of the event, ‘the most 
expensive in history, [which] has made governments and their citizens wary of 
hosting the Games’ in the future and reportedly led to a withdrawal of a 
promising Oslo’s bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics (Gibson, 2014). 
Considering the opposite influence in the co-branding process, the theory 
suggests that we can also project the event’s image on the host country’s 
image. To discuss it, firstly the current social representation of Russia was 
studied aiming to answer the second research question about the current 
public perception of the country. Figure 5 shows that many of the associations 
are widely known and mostly negative stereotypes (“Cold Weather”, 
“Communism”, “Vodka”, “Danger”), with even more negative associations in 
the 10% - 15% retention range (“Cold War”, “Corruption”, and others), as seen 
in Table 4. Notably, the term “Olympics” is mentioned by only 5.8% of the 
respondents, and looking at Table 4, “Sochi” is not present either, giving way 
to major Russian cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. “Putin” is a very strong 
stand-alone association in Russia’s social representation, mentioned by 
almost half of the respondents.  
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Finally, the third research question aimed to study the influence of the Sochi 
2014 Winter Olympics on the national image of Russia, namely the second 
half of the co-branding process between the event and the host country. The 
interviewees generally agreed that the event had a certain positive short-term 
impact on the nation brand, which had huge potential for further development, 
aiming for the success of London 2012. In the longer run, however, the 
current social representation of Russia, outlined above, shows no substantial 
evidence of the reverse image transfer. In other words, we cannot conclude 
that the Sochi 2014 Olympics significantly influenced the way in which Russia 
is perceived today. 
Consider a few examples. Despite the argument in the literature review that 
the Sochi 2014 project was bound up with the Russian President personally, 
the connection of Putin with a more generic term “Winter Olympic Games” is 
almost absent (mentioned by 1,9% of the respondents), while it is very strong 
with “Russia”. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the word “Olympics” is 
hardly present in Russia’s social representation. Finally, the only common 
word in both social representations is “Snow”, which is hardly an outcome of 
an image transfer process. 
Notably, from a broader perspective, the image of Russia has even been 
reportedly declining after the Olympics. Anholt-GBK Nation Brands Index 
(NBI) 2014 press release, for instance, states: 
‘In previous years, Russia had shown upward momentum - but in the 
2014 NBI study, it stands out as the only nation out of 50 to suffer a 
precipitous drop.  <…> Overall in this year’s study, Russia has slipped 
three places to 25th’ (GFK, 2014). 
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The current research offers two possible though not mutually exclusive 
explanations of a negative trend in the international perception of Russia and 
a virtual absence of influence of the Sochi Olympics on it. 
First of all, the project was largely supervised by the Russian government and 
the President personally. It was also almost entirely funded by public money. 
Of course, it secured the event’s vital needs, but speaking of the relation of 
the event to nation branding, it leads us to an argument that such promotion 
activities were close to what Anholt termed as an ineffective state-led 
propaganda, which initially had very little potential to change public opinion 
(Anholt, 2010, cited in Alexeyeva, 2014). Therefore, covered by an alleged 
strong intervention of the government to what was being showcased to the 
outside world, the projected image could be actually different from the reality, 
making such branding virtually useless. On the contrary, however, this 
assumption has not been discussed or confirmed by any of the interviewees. 
The second and arguably the most credible explanation is that the event 
impact has been largely overshadowed by the influence of many political 
events, which followed the Sochi Olympics literally without a break. At first, by 
the end of the Paralympics on the 16th of March 2014 there was a common 
feeling that 
‘we were the best. <…> [W]e were really cool. And we were cool in a 
good way’ (Interviewee 2, 12 August 2015). 
The unquestioned momentary success of the Sochi 2014 Organising 
committee was confirmed by all the interviewees. But a couple of months 
later, it could no longer confront the negative influence of a series of events, 
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which instantly became a prevailing theme in the media, and whose details 
are beyond the framework of the current paper. 
‘We did our best to show the new Russia, the one without bears, vodka, 
ushanka fur hats, and so on, and in the end everything was back to 
square one’ (Interviewee 3, 12 August 2015). 
Let us finally point out the fact that in the social representation of Russia 
“Vodka” is one of the strongest associations, “Fur hats” have almost achieved 
a 10% threshold, and “Ukraine”, in its turn, exceeded it, which yet again 
suggest that the above argument is fairly plausible. 
5.1. Limitations and future research suggestions 
Though the current research is qualitative in nature and therefore it did not 
aim to frame the objective truth, it has certain limitations, outlined below. 
First of all, purposive sampling, used for the first stage of the research, 
despite having an advantage of deliberate selecting information-rich cases, 
has its shortcomings, which means ‘that the researcher may inadvertently 
omit a vital characteristic on which to select the sample, or may be 
subconsciously biased in selecting the sample’ (Gray, 2014: p.217). 
Therefore, one could argue that a different or an extended group of 
interviewees could have provided more information on the subject. 
Interviewee 1, for example, mentioned that experts in the Russian political 
environment would be the right people to help to explore the subject deeper. 
Next, the second stage of the research resulted in surveying a limited sample 
of 104 individuals with rather uneven demographical characteristics, which 
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could have skewed the outcome. There is also a twofold issue with the 
number of provided free word-associations. Consider 46.2% and 42.3% of the 
respondents, which provided a full set of 10 required associations for the 
terms “Winter Olympic Games” and “Russia” respectively. One could argue 
that there is some potentially missing additional data, as their responses were 
limited by a maximum of only 10 words. At the same time, this might suggest 
that the rest of the respondents gave less associations as they did not think of 
the terms deeply enough, which leads to more missing data. 
Finally, the current research can be further expanded. First of all, other cases 
can be selected to contribute to the field of nation branding through mega-
events and Olympics in particular. For instance, Beijing has been awarded the 
2022 Winter Games, which can be a good case for a longitudinal study, 
especially considering China’s relatively recent intentions to use the 2008 
Olympics as a nation brand communication platform, which was discussed 
earlier. Russia, in its turn, will host the 2018 FIFA World Cup, which might 
become another case worth studying and comparing to the Sochi Olympics. 
Finally, the current case of the Sochi 2014 project can be more profoundly 
studied using different methodology approaches, including quantitative 
research methods. Finally, the current study can be replicated in the future to 
see the changes in social representations of the two terms in question. 
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6. Conclusion 
The aims of this paper were to discuss the theoretical framework of nation 
branding using mega events as a communication platform, and to study the 
case of nation branding of Russia through the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, 
using a two-stage qualitative methodological approach. 
The literature review outlined the scholarly debate around the controversy and 
complexity of nation brands and nation branding as a process. Further, some 
cases of using the Olympic games for place promotion purposes were 
considered. The case of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics was studied in 
detail, focusing on the media pressure throughout the preparation period. It 
was argued that one of the main communication messages of the event, 
aimed at a global audience, was to project the image of a modern country, to 
promote positive changes, breaking certain long-established stereotypes 
about Russia. The notion was widely discussed in many previous academic 
papers, and was actually confirmed by the current study, grounding on the 
interviews with the people directly related to the Sochi 2014 communication 
strategy. 
Then, social representations of Winter Olympic Games and Russia were 
studied through a public survey to explore the relation between the two terms, 
based on the principles of co-branding process, revealing that from today’s 
perspective there is no significant influence of the Sochi Games on the 
perception of Russia among an international audience, despite the proved 
success of the event itself. Nevertheless, the successful event managed to 
overcome all the unfavourable predictions of protests and boycotts, and 
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ultimately, broke a predetermined negative public perception of the host 
country. Two possible reasons, both involving an undesired level of 
government intervention, were offered to explain why the impact, however, 
was not sustainable.  
The main two implications of the current research paper for policy makers are 
as follows. First of all, let us follow the argument that state-led nation branding 
is often a pointless exercise, sometimes marginally different from a 
propaganda. Therefore, policy makers should primarily focus on what good 
national causes they actually take care of, rather than take every chance to 
impose any ungrounded perceptions of their work on an international 
audience. Secondly, no success becomes sustainable effortlessly. Thus to 
maintain a positive influence of a mega event on a nation brand, the 
communication message should be supported by every following opportunity, 
but not damaged instantly, as it happened in the case of the first Russian 
Winter Olympics, followed by the country’s involvement in one of the world’s 
major conflicts. 
  
 45 
References 
Alekseyeva, A., 2014. Sochi 2014 and the rhetoric of a new Russia: image 
construction through mega-events. East European Politics, 30(2), pp.158-174. 
Anholt, S., 2005. Editorial. Place Branding, 1(4), pp.333–346. 
Anholt, S., 2006. Why brand? Some practical considerations for nation 
branding. Place Branding, 2(2), pp.97-107. 
Anholt, S., 2007. Competitive identity: The new brand management for 
nations, cities and regions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Anholt, S., 2008. Place branding: Is it marketing, or isn’t it? Place Branding 
and Public Diplomacy, 4(1), pp.1-6. 
Anholt, S., 2010. Places: Identity, image and reputation. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Arnold, R. and Foxall, A., 2014. Lord of the (Five) Rings: Issues at the 2014 
Sochi Winter Olympic Games: Guest Editors' Introduction. Problems of Post-
Communism, 61(1), pp.3-12. 
Ashworth, G. and Kavaratzis, M., eds. 2010. Towards effective place brand 
management. Branding European cities and regions. Cheltenham; 
Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
Berg, B. L. and Lune, H., 2014. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social 
Sciences. 8th ed. Harlow: Pearson. 
Berkowitz, P., Gjermano, G., Gomez, L. and Schafer, G., 2007. Brand China: 
using the 2008 Olympic Games to enhance China's image. Place Branding 
and Public Diplomacy, 3(2), pp.164-178. 
Bodet, G. and Lacassagne, M. F., 2012. International place branding through 
sporting events: a British perspective of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. European 
Sport Management Quarterly, 12(4), pp.357-374. 
 46 
Bowdin, G., O'Toole, W., Allen, J., Harris, R. and McDonnell, I., 2011. Events 
management. 3rd ed. Amsterdam; London: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Boykoff, J., 2014a. Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the games in 
Vancouver and London. New Brunswick; London: Rutgers University Press. 
Boykoff, J., 2014b. Celebration capitalism and the Olympic games. London: 
Routledge. 
Castel, P., Lacassagne, M. F. and Salès-Wuillemin, É., 2002. Categorial 
points of view in social representation. Language Sciences, 24(5), pp.667-
678. 
Chappelet, J. L., 2012. Mega sporting event legacies: A multifaceted concept. 
Papeles de Europa, 25, pp.76-86. 
Crompton, J. L., 1995. Economic impact analysis of sports facilities and 
events: Eleven sources of misapplication. Journal of sport management, 9(1), 
pp.14-35. 
Davies, L. E., 2010. Sport and economic regeneration: a winning 
combination? Sport in society, 13(10), pp.1438-1457. 
De Vaus, D. A., 2001. Research design in social research. London: SAGE. 
Dinnie, K., 2008. Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice. Oxford: 
Butterworth Heinemann. 
Essex, S. and Chalkley, B., 1998. Olympic Games: catalyst of urban change. 
Leisure studies, 17(3), pp.187-206. 
Essex, S. and Chalkley, B., n.d. Geography at Plymouth: Policy and 
Governance in Europe Research Group. Research Themes. The Olympic 
Games: catalyst of urban change. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://www6.plymouth.ac.uk/files/extranet/docs/ ssb/eurolympicgames.pdf> 
(Accessed 17 September 2015). 
 47 
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